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RECENT BOOKS 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD ORDER. The Struggle for Human Rights 
in the United Nations. By Moses Moskowitz. New York: Oceana Publi-
cations. 1958. Pp. 239. $3.95. 
This is a valuable addition to the vast literature on questions of the 
international protection of human rights which has appeared since World 
War II. It is interesting to the student who is familiar with the subject. 
It is also a very good introduction to what has become a very involved 
accumulation of law and fact. 
In describing the human rights activities of the United Nations the 
author deals with the Charter and with the ambitious project of the 
International Bill of Human Rights, of which only the first part, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, has so far materialized. 
However, the United Nations has met considerable difficulties of a political 
and technical nature in making rapid progress with what was supposed to 
be the core of the bill, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Mr. Moskowitz 
estimates that the General Assembly will require at least ten more years 
before the covenants can be opened for signature. The book gives an 
account of two outstanding examples of United Nations intervention in 
specific human rights issues, namely, the racial situation in South Africa 
and the issue of forced labor. It also deals with interim measures for the 
· protection of human rights and supplementary programs, in particular, in 
the latter category, with the so-called action program proposed by the 
United States which consists of advisory services in human rights, a system 
of periodic reports by governments, and studies of specific rights or groups 
of rights. 
The author believes that the basic considerations underlying the human 
rights program are political, social and moral, and only secondarily legal 
and constitutional. The fact remains, he adds, that the systematic develop-
ment of well defined and reliable procedures and practices which are 
indispensable to orderly international action for the advancement of 
human rights requires a clear and authoritative answer to the many 
constitutional problems which arise out of the domestic jurisdiction 
clause [Article 2 (7) of the Charter]. The failure of the United Nations to 
provide such an answer is, in the author's view, both cause and effect which 
account for the fact that ~o far the world organization has not succeeded 
in striking a balance between the appropriate spheres of national and 
international competence in the field of human rights. 
Moskowitz makes a strong plea for the right of the individual to 
petition an international authority and for the creation of the office of a 
United Nations Attorney-General for human rights. His suggestions con-
template a world-wide network of regional machineries of implementation 
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(committees and regional attorneys-general) from which an appeal would 
lie to the Central Human Rights Committee. 
A book like Human Rights and World Order, the author of which has 
for many years devoted his scholastic attainments and his great industry 
to the cause of human rights, deserves not that the review be restricted 
to a few general laudatory remarks, but that the issues which it presents 
be squarely faced and subjected to critical analysis. This will now be 
attempted. 
The main conclusion of the book is summarized in one short sentence on 
page 166, where the author states that "there is no substitute for the 
Covenants on Human Rights." In this refined and reflective age, he believes, 
moral indignation is no barrier to mischief; "but a government will reflect 
twice before risking a breach of international law." Nobody who is inter-
ested in the international protection of human rights will seriously contest 
the view that the coming into force of comprehensive legally binding 
treaties regulating all fields and all aspects of human rights and endowed 
with appropriate international supervisory machinery would be a highly 
desirable state of affairs. This is, indeed, a goal to which the United Nations 
is solemnly committed. The author underestimates, however, what already 
exists and declines to accept less complete achievements as desirable assets. 
His point of departure is an interpretation of the domestic jurisdiction 
clause of the Charter which is indistinguishable from the interpretation 
placed on this often quoted clause by the champions of unrestricted State 
sovereignty. That Moskowitz makes a brilliant plea, de lege ferenda, for the 
need for an "international rule of law in Human Rights" does not alter 
the fact that it is his proposition that the lex lata places no obligations in 
human rights matters on States and that, apart from cases which involve 
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression, it vests no 
authority in the United Nations. He states that "the Member States are 
partially liable to the jurisdiction of the United Nations in so far as they 
are subject to its enforcement authority in situations and disputes which 
the United Nations considers as requiring its intervention," i.e., by way of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. That in his view 
is the limit of the obligations deriving from acceptance of the Charter. 
So blunt a statement does not take sufficiently into account the fact that 
Member States have pledged themselves to take action for the achievement 
of universal respect for human rights (Article 56) and to fulfill in good 
faith the obligations assumed by them [ Article 2 (2)]. 
It is a consequence flowing logically from the author's general approach 
when he says, with regard to the action taken in such matters as the race 
question in South Africa and the question of forced labor, that these 
"demonstrate clearly the illusory character of United Nations intervention 
in specific questions involving human rights and its incapacity for effective 
and constructive action." While it cannot be claimed that the activities 
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of the Organization in regard to the racial situation in South Africa have 
so far been crowned with success, there will be many who dissent from his 
summary dismissal of the many similar attempts of the Organization. That 
"the United Nations fell far short of its objectives" is not surprising. 
Mr. Hammarskjold has said: "The United Nations is only a first approxi-
mation to the world order which we need and which one day must be 
brought about." (Address at the Atoms for Peace Award Ceremony, January 
29, 1959) 
Moskowitz dismisses lightly such developments as the use of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights as a yardstick for human rights standards 
by the United Nations organs and other inter-governmental organizations; 
the implementation of a series of provisions of the Declaration in special 
conventions which have come into force under the auspices of the United 
Nations, of the International Labour Organisation and of the Council of 
Europe; the incorporation of the Universal Declaration in a number of 
international conventions and other instruments; the influence of the 
Declaration upon national constitutions and legislation. He hardly does 
justice to such developments as the evolution of international procedures 
and the growth of customary rules and principles which have emerged from 
the "allegations procedure" which was established by the International 
Labour Organisation on behalf of the United Nations and on its own be-
half. [See Jenks, The International Protection of Trade Union Freedom.] 
This development took place, not on the basis of international conventions, 
but by making use of the powers inherent in the United Nations and in the 
International Labour Organisation under their basic instruments. The 
"allegations procedure" has, in scope and in weight, by far overtaken the 
importance of the more formal procedures of representation and complaint 
which are provided in the Constitution of the ILO. 
The author gives little, if any, credit to the impact on national and 
international developments of the studies and recommendations in the 
field of the status of women. He prematurely dismisses the importance of 
the "new directions in the United Nations programme" on human rights 
[See Humphrey in New York Law Forum, October 1958.] which are still 
in their initial stages. Their potentialities cannot yet be conclusively esti-
mated. Moskowitz does not deny that the advisory services, more particu-
larly in the form of seminars, or regional conferences, devoted to such 
questions as the protection of human rights in criminal law and procedure, 
hold out promise. This reviewer cannot agree with the conclusion that the 
studies (or the one study undertaken by the Commission on Human Rights, 
on "the right of everyone to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention and 
exile" which is still in a preparatory stage) "fail to come to grips with the 
facts of the situation or tend to dilute the concrete and specific in a sea 
of generalities"; nor with the opinion that the studies of discrimination 
in various areas such as education or political rights, undertaken by the 
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Sub-Commission on -Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Min-
. orities, a subsidiary body of the Commission on Human Rights, stand out 
in sharp contrast to the arbitrary arrest study undertaken by the Commis-
sion itself through a committee of four of its members. 
In general, Moskowitz perhaps overestimates the difference, in the inter-
national community as it exists today, between treaties purporting to be 
legally enforceable and pronouncements or activities which operate in the 
moral and political rather than in the legal field. The 1947 Peace Treaties 
are international instruments which contain not only legally binding pro-
Yisions to secure the enjoyment of human rights in the States concerned, 
but also provide for international machinery for the settlement of disputes 
·arising out of their interpretation and execution. Nevertheless, in some 
cases, the machinery of the Peace Treaties broke down. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, on the other hand, which is not a treaty, 
which was not the object of signature and ratification and which does 
not provide for its international implementation has, in the words of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, "acquired an authority of grow-
ing importance." 
Side by side with his rather dogmatic approach to Article 2 (7) of the 
Charter, and perhaps not quite consistently with it, Moskowitz expresses 
the opinion that whether a matter is or is not essentially within the do-
mestic jurisdiction of a State is not necessarily a legal question. It depends, 
he believes, upon the state of international relations at a particular time. 
The concept of "international relations" as denoting an academic disci-
pline different from "international law" has come into use only in recent 
years. The Permanent Court of International Justice did not use the term 
"international relations" as opposed to "international law" when in the 
Advisory Opinion concerning the Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees, 
1923, Series B, No. 4, page 24, to which Moskowitz refers, it said that the 
"question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the jurisdiction 
of a State is an essentially relative question; it depends upon the develop-
ment of international relations." The Court continued: "Thus, in the 
present state of international law (sic!), questions of -nationality are ... in 
principle within this reserved domain." It remains a question of law-to 
which, incidentally, the General Assembly has given an unmistakable 
negative reply in a long series of decisions adopted, albeit, by differently 
composed majorities-whether in spite of the Charter provisions on human 
rights, human rights questions have remained a matter which is essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of States. An "authoritative interpretation" 
of the terms of Article 2 (7), which the author so keenly desires, could be 
obtained only through the procedure of an amendment to the Charter. 
"The right of giving an authoritative interpretation of a legal rule belongs 
· solely to the person or body who has power to modify or suppress it." 
"Ejus est interpretare legem cujus condere" [Question of Jaworzina (Polish-
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Czechoslovakian frontier), Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, 6 December 1923, Series B, No. 8, page 37]. An 
amendment of the Charter on so delicate a problem as domestic jurisdic-
tion is beyond the realm of practicability. This is shown by the difficulties 
which arose in 1956, 1957 and 1958 in connection with the far less sensitive 
proposals to amend the Charter provisions about the number of the non-
permanent members of the Security Council and of the members of the 
Economic and Social Council. 
If this reviewer has expressed opinions which differ in some respect 
from those of Mr. Moskowitz, or if he has placed different emphasis on 
various developments, this does not mean that he finds himself in dis-
agreement with the main body of the book, and still less that this difference 
of opinion detracts from the scientific value and scholarly character of Mr. 
Moskowitz' contribution. The difference is more a difference of tempera-
ments. In the international field in general and in human rights in par-
ticular this reviewer accepts Marcus Aurelius' advice: " ... be content with 
achieving even slight progress in human affairs and do not consider even 
slight progress unimportant." 
Egon Schwelb• 
• Deputy Director, Division of Human Rights, United Nations. The views expressed 
in this review are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion 
of the United Nations Secretariat. 
